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Sections of urban, middle-class, modernizing Hindus of British India were 
reborn as fragments of a pan-Indian Hindu nation only in the 1940s, roughly 
hundred years after the idea itself was born.  This process of nation-building is not 
yet complete and it may never be complete. However, it has gone far in urban, 
educated, middle- and upper-middle class India where individualism and social and 
occupational mobility have steadily grown since the nineteenth century. (The 
process has gone farther among diasporic Hindus, some of whom have begun to 
think of themselves as part of a Hindu ummah, but that is not our concern at the 
moment.) Both the individuation and the mobility have taken place in a relatively 
impersonal, contractual, anonymous, urban-industrial context, where mainstream 
Hinduism in all its diversity—its innumerable castes (some figures go as high as 
70,000), tens of thousands of village gods and goddesses, hundreds of sects, 
thousands of vernacular religious epics and jatipuranas, family priests and personal 
and family deities, rituals and practices specific to castes, sects and regions—
cannot be sustained. The demand for Hinduism as a religion that an ordinary, 
socially and geographically mobile householder—as opposed to a world-
renouncer—could carry within him or her as a portable device was a direct product 
of colonial political economy and the growth of presidency towns. At the moment 
of its birth, this new Hinduism—also sometimes called reformed Hinduism, 
proudly by some, wryly by others—did not look like Hinduism at all to a vast 
majority of Indians, Hindus and non-Hindus. To them, such an ‘essentialized’, 
desiccated Hinduism, seeking to cover so many incompatible religious practices, 
lifestyles and theologies, seemed absurd.3 This majority was to be surprised; it had 
not reckoned with the new psychological demands crystallizing in colonial India. 
                                                 
1 This is an abridged version of a public lecture given to the Cluster of Excellence, Asia and 
Europe in a Global Context, the Ruprecht-Karls-University, Heidelberg, on 23 October 
2008.  
2 Professor Ashis Nandy is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Developing 
Societies, New Delhi. 
3 Years ago, I plotted the process of this reform along two axes—Semiticization and 
revaluation of Kshatriya virtues—mainly to supplement the socially more critical process 
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It was a slow and painful process of birth. Among Hindus, the first well 
known group to talk of the Hindus as an incipient national community were 
probably the Young Bengal Group in the 1840s at Calcutta, then the capital of 
British India. The group saw itself as a collection of reformers and talked of the 
Hindus and Hinduism critically, sometimes with a touch of contempt. The process 
was underwritten by the colonial tendency, reflected in the ruling culture of the Raj 
and in missionary tracts, to see Hindus as a community defined—and doomed—by 
their religion and the gradual institutionalization of this tendency in colonial law, 
education, administration and census. Partly as a reaction, within a decade or two, 
the idea of the Hindus as a nation found a different status and intellectual 
respectability in the writings of Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (1827-94), a social and 
political thinker, and Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay (1838-94), India’s first 
important novelist. They too were critical of many things Hindu but were even 
more critical of the Anglicized Indians who thought Hinduism could not be 
retooled for modern times. 4 In another two decades had emerged Brahmabandhav 
Upadhyay (1861-1907), a Catholic theologian and Vedantic scholar, who ran into 
trouble with the church in his lifetime but was to be rediscovered towards the end 
of the twentieth century as a pioneer in indigenous Christian theology.  In his other 
incarnation, Upadhyay was a Hindu nationalist scholar-activist and theorist of 
violence—so at least it seemed to his friend Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1940). As 
is well known, Tagore’s novel Chār Adhyāya is built around Upadhyay and 
Upadhyay’s guilty awareness of nationalism as a sanction for ruthless, mechanical 
violence that involves viewing human life and human emotions instrumentally.5 
One could argue that it was the desacralized, secular part of Upadhyay’s political 
Hinduism that finally ended up as Savarkar’s Hindutva.6  
 
The idea that the Hindus were the carriers of an overly diverse religion called 
Hinduism by default—and, to that extent, were an ill-formed, sleep-walking 
crypto-nation that had not actualized its possibilities—was to later become a 
central assumption of Hindu nationalism. Naturally, a certain admiration for 
Christianity and Islam, as religions in better touch with the processes of state-
formation and nation-building, was the obverse of such nationalism. All Hindu 
reform movements borrowed from these two faiths to correct the ‘inadequacies’ of 
Hinduism. Such a stance was then popular among the modernizing middle class, 
which endorsed the contempt and hostility that often tinged Hindu nationalist 
                                                 
of Sanskritization that M.N. Srinivas has studied. Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss 
and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983). A 
fourth axis was missing—the emergence of a generic, ‘portable’ Hinduism that would make 
sense not only to scholars and theologians but also to a socially and geographically mobile 
householder, cut off from his or her local, vernacular roots. To survive in the contemporary 
world, that new Hinduism had to be more open to Hindu nationalism. 
4 Sudipta Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the 
Formation of Nationalist Discourse in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
5 Upadhyay in many respects served as Tagore’s double. All three explicitly political novels 
of Tagore—Gorā (1909), Ghare Bāire (1916) and Chār Adhyāya (1934)—negotiate the 
personality and ideology of Upadhyay. For a while in his youth, Tagore himself was close 
to Hindu nationalism and, when he was moving out of that phase, he found Upadhyay 
moving towards such nationalism. Ashis Nandy, The Illegitimacy of Nationalism: 
Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Self (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
6 Ibid. For a detailed and insightful look at Upadhyay, see Julius Lipner, Life and Thought 
of a Revolutionary (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). Others elsewhere in India 
were moving towards Upadhyay’s position, indicating that it was something more than an 
idiosyncratic, personal choice. Only a few years later, Har Dayal (1888-1939) in North 
India began articulating a similar idea of political Hinduism, though without an explicit 
theory of violence. 
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attitudes towards the Hindus. The overdone emphases on Hindu pride and 
masculinization of the Hindus was built on such self-hatred. 
 
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 1923 reinvented a term previously used by the 
likes of Brahmabandhab Upadhyay to describe this ideology: Hindutva.7 Hindutva, 
Savarkar made clear, was not the same as Hinduism, despite what an unthinking 
Indian Supreme Court was to declare eighty years later.8 Hindutva was a form of 
political Hinduism that sought to organize and militarize the Hindus as a 
nationality. Without such nationality, the argument went, there could be no basis 
for nationalism in a highly diverse society and, without nationalism, there could be 
no nation-state.  From the beginning, Hindutva had a strong masculine content. 
Savarkar was probably the first and the last to call India a fatherland (pitrubhu) and 
not a motherland (matrubhumi). To introduce this Continental usage, he had to 
dredge Sanskrit grammar to shed the common term bhumi (land), which was 
feminine, and use the rarer bhu. To this pitrubhu you could not even sing one of 
the unofficial national anthems of the freedom fighters, Bande Mataram.  
 
To this fatherland, by virtue of the sacred geography associated with it, the 
Hindus had an exclusive right, Savarkar believed. Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin defines 
the secular Zionist as the one who believes that there is no God but insists that He 
has given the land of Israel to the Jews nonetheless.9 Savarkar, a hardboiled atheist 
who did not believe in sacred geographies, was even less embarrassed to claim the 
whole of India for the Hindus on the ground of sacred geography.    
 
When Savarkar propounded his two-nation theory—the first to explicitly do 
so in South Asia—it was a clear sixteen years before the Muslim League embraced 
the idea of the Hindus and the Muslims as two distinctive nations and demanded 
the division of India. His pioneering efforts in this respect were recognized. R.C. 
Majumdar, who called Savarkar a ‘great revolutionary leader’, was clear about 
wherefrom the League got its inspiration: it ‘took serious notice of the frank 
speeches of Savarkar.’10 But the idea of nationhood as the marker of a people was 
not Savarkar’s either; he borrowed it from European thinkers like Guiseppe 
Mazzini (1805-72). Mazzini was not unknown in India, thanks to the early Bengali 
Hindu nationalists such as Upadhyay. Only the likes of Upadhyay did not include 
in their repertoire an ideology of political and cultural exclusion, leavened with 
hatred, as Savarkar openly did. In a public speech in 1925, Savarkar said that 
Indians had to learn to eschew soft values like ‘humility, self-surrender and 
forgiveness’ and cultivate ‘sturdy habits of hatred, retaliation, vindictiveness’.11 
Occasionally he went further. At one place in his writings, he seems miserable that 
his heroes, Shivaji and Chinaji Appu, did not rape Muslim women, ‘because of 
                                                 
7 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?  (1923) (Bombay: Veer 
Savarkar, 1969). 
8 Justice J.S. Verma, who delivered the judgement, was to, however, later claim that 
politicians had misused his judgement, without admitting that the judgement gave a suspect 
political ideology the status of a religion, which even Savarkar and the RSS had not 
claimed. On Justice Verma’s self-justification, see ‘My Verdict was Misinterpreted’, 
Hindustan Times, 7 February 2003. 
9 Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, Presentation in the session on ‘Contemporary Debates in the 
West: Secular Norms, Multiculturalism, and Immigrant Incorporation’, Conference on The 
Secular, Secularizations, and Secularisms at the Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin, 7-10 June 
2006. 
10 R.C. Majumdar quoted in A.G. Noorani, Savarkar and Hindutva: The Godse Connection 
(New Delhi: LeftWord, 2002). 
11 M.R. Jayakar, Story of My Life, Vol. 2, p. 541, quoted in Noorani, Savarkar and 
Hindutva, pp. 25-6.  
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then prevalent suicidal ideas about chivalry to women, which ultimately proved 
highly detrimental to the Hindu community.’12 To spite admirers who might think 
this to be an aberration, in 1965 at the age of 82, Savarkar wrote in the wake of the 
India-Pakistan war that took place that year: ‘Pakistan’s barbaric acts such as 
kidnapping and raping Indian women would not be stopped unless Pakistan was 
given tit for tat.’ One suspects that violence to Savarkar was not merely a 
revolutionary tool, but an end in itself, as if he was seeking legitimate targets to 
express the free-floating anger within him.13  
 
Savarkar may not have been honest about many things but he had a Brahminic 
respect for ideas. When in the 1940s Mohammad Ali Jinnah began to go places 
with his two-nation theory, Savarkar was honest enough to say: ‘I have no quarrel 
with Mr. Jinnah’s two-nation theory. We Hindus are a nation by ourselves and it is 
a historical fact that Hindus and Muslims are two nations.’14 
 
 
I 
 
It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness … this sense of always 
looking at one’s self through the eyes of another, measuring one’s soul by 
the type of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity … two souls, 
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark 
body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. 
 
W.E.B. Dubois, quoted in Charles Long15 
 
Savarkar’s life became controversial only after independence, more so after 
his death. As details of his role in Gandhi’s murder and his obsequious letters to 
British authorities, seeking forgiveness and promising loyalty, began to get better 
known, they led to all-round embarrassment. However, that does not fully explain 
the attempts to undervalue his anti-imperialist record in recent years, why even the 
fifty-year sentence passed on him is not considered a proof of his credentials as a 
freedom fighter. Nor does it explain why there has been so little acceptance that, 
after being sentenced to jail for fifty years in one’s mid-twenties, one may have 
failure of nerve and collapse of self-esteem. True, the criticisms often come from 
those who have no direct or indirect link with the freedom struggle against the 
world’s then-reigning superpower and have the luxury of demanding total 
                                                 
12 V.D. Savarkar, The Six Golden Epochs of Indian History (New Delhi: Rajdhani 
Granthanagar, 1970), p. 71. Quoted by Kavita Krishnan, ‘Unveiling Savarkar: Picture 
Imperfect’, www. Cpiml.org/liberation/year-2003/April. 
13 Even this may not be the whole story. Lloyd deMause has argued that the origins of war 
lie partly in the fantasy of war as righteous rape. Savarkar might have reversed the process, 
imagining rape as a form of war that allegedly makes nations. Lloyd deMause, The 
Emotional Life of Nations (New York: Karnac Books, 2002), Ch. 6. Suresh Sharma argues 
that Savarkar reneged on the inclusive nationalism of his earlier years ‘not because Hindu 
rashtra represented a higher ideal’ but because he came to the conclusion that his earlier 
project was not a feasible one, whereas a Hindu nation was a realizable goal. Sharma, 
‘Savarkar’s Quest’, p. 202. Sharma is not wrong but his interpretation does not fully 
explain the low rhetoric and passions of an otherwise Machiavellian politician who was 
proudly dispassionate and impersonal. For that one must take into account the inner 
demons that populated Savarkar’s world. 
14 Indian Annual Register, 1943, 2, p.10. Quoted in Anil Nauriya, ‘The Savarkarist Syntax’, 
The Hindu, 18 September 2004. 
15 Charles Long, Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Imagesin the Interpretation of 
Religion (Aurora, Colorado: The Davies Group, 1995), p. 178. 
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constancy and persistent self-sacrifice. But it is also true that there has been no 
enquiry in depth into the inner drives that pushed Savarkar to his particularly petty 
version of xenophobia. Was his violence an unrealistic, adolescent search for a 
heroic stature, which collapsed the moment he confronted its ‘natural’, inevitable 
consequences under a colonial dispensation? Did the Muslims become for him a 
safer target, once he sensed the might of the British Empire? Did he represent or 
tap a political-psychological potentiality in urban, middle-class, educated India 
during the last hundred years? Is that potentiality a price India has paid for its 
modernization? Are the attempts to demonize Savarkar ultimately a form of 
exorcism? 
 
The last two questions are especially important. The hostility Savarkar arouses 
is the hostility towards one who dares to remind us that the post-seventeenth-
century idea of nation-state and secularism have both been complicit with 
ethnoreligious violence during the last two centuries. For Savarkar’s hatred for 
Muslims came not from ideas of ritual purity and impurity or caste hierarchy but 
from his prognosis of communities that could or could not be integrated—
assimilated or dissolved—within the framework of a modern Indian state. The 
standard conventions of a nation-state within the Westphalian model constituted 
his religion and he brought to it the fervour of a fundamentalist. He was not willing 
to wait for the decline of communities, the spread of literacy and urban-industrial 
values—individuation, secularization and instrumental rationality—to ensure 
nation-formation in a society organized around a different set of principles. 
Actually, he was searching for something more substantial than territoriality to 
give Indian nationalism a stable base. The search was not unknown to modern 
Indians; many had mounted it before Savarkar and many others were to do so after 
him. But most of them avoided facing the full implications of it. Savarkar was 
more open and honest about his goals. Hence the periodic obsessive concern in 
India with the life of a person who throughout life remained at the margin of Indian 
politics and whom mainstream India and Hinduism never knew well enough to 
forget.  
 
The second part of the story is the record of secularism in genocides, even 
ethnonationalist genocides, in the last hundred years. Data on mass violence show 
that secular states, backed by secular ideologies, account for at least two-thirds of 
all the deaths in organized mass violence during the twentieth century.16 Savarkar 
typifies the attitudes and the motivational structure—the genocidal mentality—that 
underlies politically engineered mass violence.17 The conservative folk theory of 
secularism in many parts of the globe, particularly its South Asian variants cannot 
cope with this reality. G.P. Deshpande acknowledges this when he calls Savarkar a 
‘secular communalist’ vending a ‘supra-religious ideology’, but does not sense 
how absurd these expressions sound in South Asian intellectual circles where 
secularism is seen as a magical cure of all communal passions.18 Nor is Deshpande 
willing to take the next step and to read Savarkar as a pathological by-product of 
the modern idea of a secular nation-state rather than that of Hinduism. 
 
                                                 
16 See for example R.J. Rummel, Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 
1900 (West Hanover, Mass.: Christopher Publishing, 1994). 
17 See for example Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen, The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi 
Holocaust and the Nuclear Threat (New York: Basic, 1990). 
18 G.P. Deshpande, ‘An Occasion for the RSS’, Economic and Political Weekly, 25 March 
2006. Deshpande also points out that Savarkar conceptualized Hindutva as some kind of 
Hegelian Geist. It is not clear from his brief but insightful comment whether Savarkar 
borrowed as directly from Hegel as he did from Mazzini. 
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This love-hate relationship with Savarkar in sections of India’s urban middle 
class and the political identity he offered can be read, more aptly, as a lesson on the 
limits of nineteenth-century modernity, scientific rationality and political realism 
rather than as pathological ethnophobia. He is one person who had grasped the 
scope modern rationality offered to act out the hate within him and his attitudes to 
Hindutva and the Hindus were as instrumental as his attitude towards the Muslims. 
His rationalist, amoral, anti-religious self had paradoxically arrived at the 
conclusion that only religion could be an efficacious building block for nation- and 
state-formation in South Asia and he did not know where to stop. In his 
impersonal, reified, Brahminic ideas of statecraft and politics, there was not much 
place for emotions, certainly not for compassion. The aloof ruthlessness came 
packaged in an arrogant trust in his cleverness and strategizing skills.  
 
Even Savarkar’s atheism was not the philosophical atheism associated with 
Buddhism and Vedanta, but the anti-clerical, hard atheism of fin-de-siècle 
scientism, increasingly popular among sections of the European middle class and, 
through cultural osmosis, in parts of modern India.19 His politics paralleled the way 
European racism in the 1940s drew upon modern science, particularly nineteenth-
century biology and eugenics, and saw itself responsible for doing the dirty work 
of scientized history.20 The sceptics might like to look up Savarkar’s comments on 
the cow, worshipped as sacred by most Hindus, and compare it with the position of 
the organizations and parties that constitute the Hindu nationalist formation today. 
While the latter try to pander to the sentiments of the Hindus, Savarkar publicly 
supported cow slaughter when necessary and declared the cow to be a useless 
animal with no sacredness about it.21 He also advised Hindus to give up 
vegetarianism and eat fish and eggs.22 When Gandhi’s assassin and Savarkar’s 
protégé Godse complained in his last testament in court about Gandhi’s 
‘superstitious’ use of ideas like soul force and fasting in modern politics, it was not 
the accusation of a Hindu fundamentalist. It mirrored Savarkar’s statism.  
 
Over the last eighty years, most ideologues of Hindu nationalism have neither 
come from orthodox Hinduism nor have they flaunted their orthodoxy the way 
Gandhi did, by proclaiming himself a Sanatani Hindu. They have proudly affirmed 
                                                 
19 Nothing expressed Savarkar’s tough-minded atheism better than his refusal to allow any 
Hindu religious ritual or rite when his wife died, notwithstanding public protests and 
Satyagraha by some of his followers. He did not want even her body to be brought home, 
saying that it was ‘no use lamenting over the dead body.’ Keer, Veer Savarkar, pp. 529-30.  
20 Aditya Nigam in a comment has differentiated between two styles of Hindu nationalism, 
one typified by Savarkar and the other by Golwalkar, the believing Hindu who came to 
head the RSS in the 1940s. He suggests that Golwalkar’s is the more dangerous version. 
Aditya Nigam, ‘Reading between the Chinks in Pariwar Armour’, Tehelka, 25 June 2005, 
p. 20. Nigam may be right, because the likes of Golwalkar can take Hindu nationalism into 
Hinduism and reshape the culture of Indian politics and, at the end, Hinduism in a way that 
Savarkar could never do. On the other hand, Savarkar seems to conform more faithfully to 
the profile of the fascist personality as portrayed in post-World War II psychoanalysis and 
social and political psychology. Could it be that, despite the rhetoric of public debate in 
India, the ‘classical’ European fascism in India can be the ideology of only a conspiratorial 
political fringe and the more dangerous sources of political authoritarianism lie elsewhere?  
21 Dayanand Saraswati, the founder of Arya Samaj, also approved of eating beef in the first 
edition of Satyārthaprakāsh (1874) but the remark was dropped from the second edition in 
1882. P.C. Ghosh, The Development of Indian National Congress (1892-1909) (Calcutta: 
Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960); quoted in Sharma, ‘Savarkar’s Quest for a Modern 
Hindu Consolidation’, p.69. As is well known, similar comments are attributed to 
Vivekananda, too.  
22 Keer, Veer Savarkar, pp. 443-4. 
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their links with the nineteenth-century Hindu reform movements, which they see as 
analogues of a masculine Protestantism, cleaning up a degraded, distorted faith to 
make it fit the needs of a national state.   
 
These ideologues borrowed from ideas that were in the air during their 
formative years. Not only among European fascists but also among the European 
intelligentsia in general and among westernized Indians trying desperately to cope 
with their feelings of inferiority and attain global respectability through tough-
minded, secular rationality wedded to ideas of national interest, social 
evolutionism, political realism and progressivism. Savarkar’s contempt for the 
likes of Gandhi came partly from that. Savarkar was not alone. The first head of the 
RSS, Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889-1940), too, could hardly be called a run-of-
the-mill, believing Hindu. An urban, well-educated, modern doctor, with poor links 
with rural India and mainstream Hinduism, he like many pioneers of Hindu 
nationalism was an aggressive critic of Hinduism and was exposed to religious and 
social reform movements, especially the Ramakrishna Mission founded in 1897 by 
Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902). Hindu nationalism, on this plane, was popular 
European political theory and political history telescoped into South Asia as a form 
of toady Hinduism. In retrospect one realizes why Gandhi insisted that the 
nineteenth-century religious reform movements had done more harm than good to 
Hinduism in the long run.  
 
The entire process has remarkable parallels with the experiences of Sri Lankan 
Buddhism and Indian Islam under colonialism and the dual impact of urbanization 
and industrialization. There is in them the same efforts to rationalize one’s faith 
and to set up demonic others who seemed better equipped to handle the demands of 
modern world and its amoral ways; they too, consequently, initiated the same kind 
of self-engineering to be able to flirt with the Dionysian in human personality. 23 As 
if they were all caught in a larger, inescapable, evolutionary process that enjoyed 
intrinsic legitimacy even among those hostile to religious nationalism.24 That partly 
explains why most conservative Muslim clerics in India opposed the idea of a 
separate country for South Asian Muslims as un-Islamic, whereas the leadership of 
the Pakistan movement sought a modern Muslim state, the way many secular, 
liberal Jews sought a Jewish state. Is the dream of a liberal, ethnonationalist, 
modern state sustainable in the long run? Or is it an oxymoron? No final answer 
has yet been given. 
 
The founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah—westernized, loyal to 
constitutionalism, staunchly secular in personal life—had as his avowed role model 
the classical liberal Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915). Jinnah kept the ulema at 
a distance throughout life, but was perfectly willing to use them to advance the 
cause of a separate homeland for South Asian Muslims. Exactly as Savarkar, 
                                                 
23 See for instance, Stanley J. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and 
Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992); and T.N. Madan, Modern 
Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). The overall cultural psychological framework within which 
Savarkar worked has been discussed in Ashis Nandy, Shikha Trivedi, Achyut Yagnik and 
Shail Mayaram), Creating a Nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the 
Self (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
24 For instance, the early Hindu nationalists were role models for Sri Lankan Buddhist 
nationalists. Anagarika Dhammapala (1864-1933) lived in Calcutta, the capital of British 
India till 1911 and was an admirer of Vivekananda. The Mahabodhi Society that 
Dhammapala established was directly inspired by the Ramakrishna Mission and less 
directly by the theosophical society. 
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despite all his anti-Muslim rhetoric and passion for united India, not only 
established coalitions in Sindh and Bengal with the Muslim League, fighting for 
Pakistan, but was proud of these alliances. He argued that the alliances were more 
nationalistic than the ministries formed by the ‘pseudo-nationalist’ Indian National 
Congress, led by Gandhi and Nehru.25 There are parallels between the trajectories 
Savarkar and Jinnah traversed and the reason they chose religion as a vehicle of 
nation-building despite being nonbelievers or casual believers. Both had 
internalized contemporary European political categories and saw nationality as a 
crucial module of sovereign, modern republics. Both sought to replicate in South 
Asia existing wisdom in the global citadels of knowledge. Both represented the 
triumph in the South not so much of history as of European history. If they were 
fundamentalists, their fundamentals came from conventional European wisdom 
about nation-building and state-formation. Defying the warning of Rabindranath 
Tagore, they owned up the ‘motive force’ of western nationalism as their own.26 
Not surprisingly, the personal relationship between Savarkar and Jinnah never 
soured. Nor did Savarkar ever entirely lose the respect of the likes of Subhas 
Chandra Bose, M.N. Roy and B.R. Ambedkar.  
 
 
II 
 
I have used some scrappy biographical details on Savarkar to pose a series of 
questions: Has it become more or less inevitable for a social group—be it a 
religion, caste, denomination, sect or ethnic entity—to gradually acquire the 
features of a nationality because that seems the only way community grievances 
can be aggregated and effectively articulated in a culture of state based on a 
concept of citizenship enmeshed with the idea of nationality? Do claims made in 
the name of a nationality have more political impact than the same claims made in 
the name of other aggregates and, as a result, has there grown, in the last hundred 
years, a tendency in religion- or ethnicity-based political formations to act as 
nationalities to empower themselves? Does that allow more effective mobilization 
in modernizing societies, particularly among the newly modern, uprooted by social 
changes and seeking new communities, real or imaginary? Does it also mean that 
such nationalism has natural limits in a society that is not fully modern? Does 
Savarkar’s marginalization in Hindu society have something to tell us?27 
 
Everyone knows that the western history of state-formation and nation-
building is simultaneously a story of how religions, denominations and ethnicities 
were bludgeoned into nationalities. For those entering the realm of history for the 
first time in Asia and Africa—and facing the hierarchies and exclusions of the 
global state-nation system for the first time—the temptation is not only to construct 
their own history, but also to read into Europe’s history their own past, present and 
future. Even when they construct their own history, the categories and concerns 
that frame it are ‘universal’ or, it comes to the same thing, European. When that 
                                                 
25 Savarkar and Joshi, Historical Statements by V.D. Savarkar, pp. 96-105; see particularly 
pp. 99-101. 
26 Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism (London: Macmillan, 1917), pp. 77-78. 
27 I should clarify at this point that I view nationalism as an ideology that is radically 
different from the sentiment called patriotism, though the first kind of territoriality may 
build upon or mobilize for its purposes the second kind. For a more extended discussion of 
the issue, see Ashis Nandy, ‘Nationalism, Genuine and Spurious: A Very Late Obituary of 
Two Early Post-Nationalist Strains in India’, Third Usha Mehta Memorial Lecture, 
delivered at the Nehru Centre, Mumbai, on 9 September 2005. Published in Economic and 
Political Weekly, 12 August 2006, pp. 3500-4. 
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reading is deployed as an evolutionary grid in an Asian or African society, there is 
a natural fear that unless one builds a nation, whatever its cost in human suffering, 
one will not get justice locally or globally. 
 
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and Mohammed Ali Jinnah were not personally 
as culpable as many like to believe. The evil that many locate in them resided, at 
least partly, in the political ideas that dominated the world. Savarkar and Jinnah 
were, like most first-generation builders of South Asian states, faithful and 
obedient pupils of the Bismarckian state and post-medieval European 
republicanism, both vital parts of the dominant culture of commonsense in their 
times. Once they accepted that culture, they could not but try to duplicate Europe’s 
history in South Asia, whatever the cost. Not surprisingly, neither of the two ever 
mourned seriously, in public, the unnecessary death of more than a million people 
in the bloodbath that came with the division of British India.28 For both, human 
beings were means of implementing larger historical designs. The rationality they 
worshipped overlay deep emotional voids, created by personal losses that came 
almost like betrayals by fate. Both coped with the betrayal through 
uncompromising, dispassionate, ruthless pursuit of a form of political rationality 
that allowed and even glorified withdrawal from or avoidance of personal 
emotional involvements.29 Both lived with fragile, perhaps anchorless self-
definitions that pushed them to embrace aggressive, ideological postures that 
tallied with their deeper psychological needs. In politics if you wear a mask long 
enough, it becomes your face. 
 
Jinnah’s case was more tragic. In his famous speech of 11 August 1947, three 
days before the birth of Pakistan, he declared inclusive nationalism based on 
territoriality as his project and sought to distinguish between inclusive and sectoral 
nationalism exactly the way Jawaharlal Nehru did.30 He wanted Pakistan not to 
exclude non-Muslims in principle and in practice. Himself a Shia, Jinnah included 
in Pakistan’s first cabinet an Ahmadiya as the foreign minister and a Hindu Dalit as 
the minister of law. 31 Pakistan’s first national anthem was written by a Hindu and, 
it is said, Jinnah had a hand in that choice. These did not help; it was too late or, 
perhaps, too early. Nor could Indian nationalism, despite the presence of leaders 
such as Jawaharlal Nehru, avoid full-scale militarization, nuclearism and 
intermittent religious and ethnonationalist violence. Nationalism, once let out of 
                                                 
28 I have already drawn attention to Savarkar’s fascination with gratuitous violence in 
political matters. That fascination, though it came packaged in the rhetoric of revolution, 
preceded his ideological convictions. Many have found more disorienting the openness to 
violence of Jinnah, whom Eqbal Ahmad has called a liberal constitutionalist.  Eqbal 
Ahmad, Confronting Empire, Interviews with David Barsamian (London: Pluto Press, 
2000), p. 10. Kuldip Nayar, for instance, says that when Jinnah was asked in 1946, after the 
call for Direct Action given by the Muslim League, whether Direct Action would be violent 
or non-violent, Jinnah said, ’I am not going to discuss ethics.’ Kuldip Nayar, Scoop: Inside 
Stories from the Partition to the Present (New Delhi: HaperCollins, 2006), p. 25. 
29 See the unpublished paper of psychoanalysts Salman Akhtar and Manasi Kumar, 
‘Destiny and Nationalism: Mohammad Ali Jinnah’. Also delivered as a lecture at the India 
International Centre, New Delhi, 2006. 
30 Mr. Jinnah's first Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 11 
August 1947, 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/pakistan/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_ 
11aug1947. html 
31 It is remarkable that the passage of modern, secular constitutions of both India and 
Pakistan were officially piloted by two Dalits, Babasaheb Ambedkar and Jogen Mandal. 
The former, who of course played a more significant role in shaping the constitution of his 
country, is virtually deified in India; the latter is forgotten in both countries. 
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the bag, becomes self-sustaining and acquires its own political-psychological 
agenda.  
 
Many Southern scholars, blinded by nationalism’s anti-imperialist role in the 
South, believe it can be tamed and used creatively. The experiences of South Asia 
in the last two centuries suggest that usually religions and cultures change to 
accommodate nationalism, not the other way round. Savarkar, whom many see as a 
minor pawn of South Asian history, did change not only South Asian Hinduism but 
also South Asian Islam and Buddhism. All three had to accommodate strains that 
have more in common with house-broken versions of Christianity in Europe and 
North America than with home-grown, South Asian Hinduism, Islam and 
Buddhism.32 
 
Ultimately, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar is the name of a blown-up, grotesque 
temptation inherent in the Southern world’s encounter with the global nation-state 
system and with religious traditions that facilitate the internalization of the motive 
force of western nationalism. That temptation is a part of everyone dreaming of 
working with tamed versions of nationalism and nation-states armed with ideas of 
rationality, secularism, progress and the so-called lessons of history, untouched by 
empathy, compassion and other such subjectivist traps.  
 
                                                 
32 For instance, E. Valentine Daniel, ‘The Arrogation of Being by the Blind-Spot of 
Religion’, Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies, July 2001, 33(1), pp. 83-102. True, 
surveys done in India suggest that only about 10 per cent of those who vote for Hindu 
nationalist parties do so on ideological grounds, but in absolute numbers that is a 
substantial presence. Data Unit of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 1998 
Survey of General Elections in India. 
